National Security Online Resource Center

As the weekend fast approaches, a few thoughts and stories from the week:

• SPC Erik Oropeza has been awarded the Army’s second highest award, the Distinguished Service Cross.  SPC Oropeza was in a Stryker when a massive IED (13 155mm howitzer rounds) detonated beneath his vehicle.  He somehow survived the blast and regained consciousness a few minutes later, at which point he engaged insurgents around his vehicle and providing first aid to wounded personnel in the Stryker until he was able to summon a medevac. 
• An under-reported bit of news was the closing of Manas Air Base, in Kyrgyztan.  Manas was a major logistical asset in supplying the US effort in Afghanistan, but the Kyrgyz government has said its decision to close the case is final, citing a host of concerns.  The fact that Kyrgyztan recently accepted a $2 billion aide package from Russia also has a few US officials miffed, since there is apparent suspicion of Russian pressure for the closure.  It’s unclear at this time where the logistical functions will be shifted to after Manas closes.
• On the lighter side, this list by Cracked.com, while rather crass (and somewhat vulgar) is absolutely hilarious and rather well researched.  Worth a read for a laugh.

Today’s top story on Army Times is a pretty interesting read.  Long story short, reports from 1991 and 1994 recapped the HUMVEEs performance in the Gulf War and in Somalia and found it extremely vulnerable to IEDs and anti-tank mines, even with up-armor kits.  The implication, of course, is that we should never have rolled into Iraq with inadequate vehicles.

This is an interesting case, in part because it shows the mentality of the military through the 90s.  Half the reason that a replacement for the HUMVEE was never at the top of the to-do list was because no one at the Pentagon really thought we’d end up in a protracted ground war.  The coalition operations in Kosovo were a poster-child for future military operations (high-tech, low footprint, and lots of airpower) and evidently, nobody thought we’d need an armored utility vehicle in mass numbers.

Thankfully, we’re using MRAPs in increasing numbers nowadays which, as the article says, increase survivability by 400%.  Even so, it is unfortunate that it took as long as it did (4+ years) to start fielding the MRAP in large numbers. Hindsight on the performance of the HUMVEE should provide an important lesson about flexibility in procurement for the future.