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The dangers of a failed state are multi-faceted, ranging from regional power-vacuum to breeding ground for terrorism. It is relatively recent, however, that the utterly imploded state of Somalia began to present the seemingly outmoded threat of piracy. To understand the nature of the modern threat, as well as the recent victory by the US Navy, it is necessary to understand the recent history of Somalia.

Long story short, Somalia isn’t a very nice place to live. There hasn’t been a functional, central government since 1991, when the Somali Civil War broke out. This Civil War was the cause of the instability and ultimate famine that forced international intervention in 1992, during Operation Restore Hope. Many Somalis resented the foreign intervention, however, and there was large scale resistance to the UN presence, culminating in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 (the famous “Blackhawk Down” incident). After US forces withdrew in the aftermath of the battle, the UN was forced to severely scale-back operations until the UN withdrew altogether in 1995.

During the post-UN years (the mid to late 90s) various warlords and fiefdoms rose in Somalia, gaining de facto independence. No central government with real power exerted control over the nation, which in many regards only existed on paper. Eventually, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a Sharia government system, began to rise to prominence and challenged the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which had nominal control of Somalia. The CIA was concerned about terrorist backing from the ICU and leant a good deal of support to the TFG through the early to mid-2000s. Despite this support, the ICU gained power through 2006, and eventually succeeded in capturing Mogadishu and largely wresting control of the country from the TFG.

The tenuous position of the TFG led directly to the formation of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), an organization of secular, anti-ICU warlords in Mogadishu. The ARPCT, with CIA backing, began a larger campaign against the ICU and escalated violence throughout Somalia’s urban centers, but was also defeated in several key engagements. The dual defeats of the TFG and ARPCT led Ethiopia to intervene as well, and this intervention finally succeeded in tipping the scales against the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU was soundly defeated, saving Somalia from rule by Islamic Extremists, but bringing about a new age of anarchy that still grips Somalia today.

Ultimately, Somalia’s piracy is a simple result of lawlessness. Somalia has not had a real, functioning government for nearly twenty years. The ICU was almost a functional government and actually managed to reign in piracy for a brief period, but this security came at the expense of religious extremism and support for al-Qaeda. Thus, the ICU’s reign was short-lived and the new-found anarchy leaves little obstruction to large-scale piracy. Simply put, Somali’s location along the Gulf of Aden funnels a whole lot of shipping along the Somali coast and makes for an ideal location from which to launch pirate attacks.

Furthermore, Somalia has almost 1,900 miles of coastline which, to put it in perspective, is nearly the distance from Los Angeles to Chicago. That is a whole lot of territory to cover, especially when the ships that are being sought can easily blend in with civilian fishing vessels. Even with a multi-national effort, it is no small task to patrol that length of coast. Worse, the pirates have reportedly been operating off of “mother-ships” recently, launching small-boats from larger vessels while already at sea. This adds depth to the area that must be patrolled (ie rather than just patrolling the coast-line, pirates may now launch hundreds of miles off the coast from their mother-ships), further complicating matters for world navies.

The events of this past week remind us that in any direct confrontation, a modern navy will be able to deal with pirates while handily. No pirate vessel in the world is remotely close to a match for a modern-warship, and no pirates are a match for special operations forces, such as US Navy SEALs. The issue, however, is bringing the pirates to battle. The pirates are fully cognizant of how outmatched they are in a fire-fight, and it is therefore in their interest to avoid combat whenever possible. Similarly, many countries find that it is far easier to permit shipping companies and insurance corporations to negotiate ransoms rather than engage in costly (and risky) rescue operations.

Additionally, as many TV talking heads have been quick to point out this week, piracy is really a symptom of the state of utter lawlessness in Somalia. Improving the piracy situation through brute naval force may not be the most cost-effective solution and could prove myopic. This having been said, with US forces still stretched thin, it is difficult to imagine would could be done ashore to improve matters. The US has already attempted the intelligence agency-driven victory by using the CIA to back Ethiopian and secular forces to overthrow the ICU. Unfortunately, the chaos that ensued was the very circumstance that gave rise to the modern piracy issue and it appears unlikely that further such intelligence oriented intervention will give rise to a more stable state that will be able to exert control over Somalia’s coast. Thus, while it is tempting to wish for a whole-state solution to the issue, the realism of such an alternative is questionable at best.

If whole-state solutions are discounted, a number of options still exist for managing the pirate problem. What must be kept in mind is why piracy thrives in Somalia: it is big business. Therefore, in order for piracy to end, it must cease to be profitable. The counter-piracy actions this past week were therefore a step in the right direction: by showing that piracy will be dealt with through swift, lethal force, there is a substantial disincentive for participating in piracy. Similar well-focused strikes against pirate bases ashore and suspected pirate “mother-ships” will deal blows to piracy by not-only killing pirates and destroying pirate infrastructure, but by driving the risk and capital cost of piracy up, decreasing profitability. If these steps are coupled with a concerted effort by corporations and states to enhance the defenses of cargo ships (ie loosening restrictions on weapons aboard merchant vessels) and a move towards rescuing crews rather than simply forking over ransoms (the whole reasons piracy functions as a business in the first place), the scourge of piracy off the Somali coast may finally be brought under control. The key is to understand why piracy occurs in the first place: because there’s a good deal of relatively easy money can be made. The international community can bring the piracy crisis under control by cutting off the flow of money (making it policy to avoid paying ransoms, whilst better protecting crews) and by making piracy itself a riskier endeavor (attacking pirate hideouts and tracking down suspected pirates). Like any illegal activity, such as the drug trade, there will always be an incentive for attempting to undertake illegal activity to make a quick buck, but concerted military effort, coupled with policy, can make the activity so risky and keep profits so low that the risks can be effectively contained.