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After being under the thumb of the Soviet Union for decades, some may find it hard to believe that the Czech Republic is now embroiled in an international dispute by entering in an agreement with the United States and becoming an intimate part of its international security policy. Recently, Former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice was in Prague standing alongside her Czech counterpart to sign the first of two treaties to allow the US to establish a radar station 55 miles outside the capital. The radar base is a key element of the missile defense shield that, when completed, is meant to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles aimed at Europe and the United States.

Though the right-leaning government has jumped at the opportunity to ally with the United States on this issue, two-thirds of the population opposes the treaties. Some concerns include environmental impact on the region. More importantly, the Czechs have major concerns on the international scene when it comes to the placement of the radar on their soil. The first is Russia and its rhetoric.

“There is a paranoia of the west,” in Russia, said Yuri Fedorov of the Association for International Affairs in Prague. Fedorov understands Russia’s need to be perceived as a dominant state despite its loss of superpower status. “Russia thinks that if they say ‘no’ it should just be accepted,” said Fedorov. It is that superiority complex that makes Russia appear so aggressive, when they are really more pragmatic.

Upon the announcement of the agreement, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement saying, “We will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but with military-technical methods.” In February, then-President Vladimir Putin threatened that Russia would “retarget our missiles toward a system that we aren’t creating.”

But the United States has stated time and time again that the system is not for defense against Russia, but Iran. “I would just like to emphasize that the missile defense system proposed for Central Europe is not aimed at Russia,” said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in October 2007. US Ambassador to the Czech Republic Richard Graber stated that the system was for “specifically Iran.” Secretary Rice found Russia’s response to the agreement “predictable” and “disappointing.”
Despite the aggressive talk, Czech authorities feel that Russia is all talk and will not act against them. “We are not afraid,” said Zuzana Isabella Tornikidis of the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC.

On the heels of all of this come reports that Iran is testing long range missiles. The timing of these tests is certainly no coincidence.

Even with the urgency stressed by Rice and Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek’s government, there are also many strategic considerations that the Czech Republic and especially the United States should review as they go forward with these plans. The problem of missile defense, according to some scholars of international security, is that it takes away the strength of the well-tested form of deterrence, mutually assured destruction (MAD).

Kenneth Waltz of Columbia University believes that missile defense posses greater danger than nuclear proliferation. In his 2004 paper, “Missile defenses and the multiplication of nuclear weapons,” Waltz states that for missile defense to be an effective deterrent, it would have to be a flawless system, with a guarantee that all missiles would be shot down. Aggressor states could counteract the missile defense system by adding more warheads, mounting decoys on its ballistic missiles or, more sinisterly, attack through other means, including terrorism. Waltz believes that in the least, this would only lead to an arms race once more, with countries such as Russia and China stockpiling enough missiles and warheads to outnumber US defense rockets.

Helle Dale, the director of The Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Institute disagrees. Dale believes that missile defense will make ballistic missiles obsolete. She also notes that in order to develop more advanced weapons, it is getting into territory that few states can afford to enter.

Dale further points out that at the Reykjavik Summit in 1986 between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan that the Soviets were willing to give up ballistic missiles so long as the Strategic Defense Initiative was discontinued. “War games have proven that missile defense stabilizes the area,” she said.

Victor A. Utgoff, a leading theorist and proponent of missile defense, like Dale, sees an inherent danger in accelerating proliferation of nuclear arms. In his 2004 essay “Missile defence and American ambitions,” Utgoff recognizes the danger posed by a renegade state obtained nuclear arms for offensive purposes. Those states proliferating will be under great pressure to quickly develop weapons and deployment systems for both defense and offensive purposes. The instability in many of these states will lead to greater probability of both nuclear accidents and the chance that rogue military units or terrorists could hijack the weapons. Utgoff argues that nations would be more comfortable with a system better defined by the United States and if the United States was clear in its purpose of ensuring international security against nuclear attack.

Dale says that most states would not use nuclear power out of respect for the damage it would cause, even if the state were protected by a shield. This would eliminate fears that the United States would try to move more aggressively as a protected hegemon.
Waltz counters that the Bush administration had all but admitted it wants to have a missile defense system in order to meddle in other nations’ affairs. Many states will develop nuclear arsenals to defend against this perceived threat. “Other countries may now use nuclear weapons to offset ours…Our conventional dominance spurs other countries to resort to unconventional means,” he writes. Waltz sees the proliferation problem as moving more slowly than Utgoff, Dale and Rice claim. MAD is still the most stable system, according to Waltz. “Why should anyone want to replace stable deterrence with unstable defense?”

Yet there is a significant ignorance to the fact that deterrence has worked with states that do not look forward to total destruction. Suicide is not that frightening for many Shi’a Muslims that run the government in Tehran, who anticipate the “return” of the twelfth imam, the mahdi. In order to prepare for the mahdi, destruction of the infidels of the west is necessary. In other words, Iran is ready for an apocalyptic war, throwing the seemingly infallible theory of MAD out the window. MAD is simply not enough to deter a nation whose government is convinced that destruction is the way to a better world.

The problem of Iran cannot be solved with missile defense alone. It must be coupled with a strong nuclear non-proliferation by the US and its allies. Despite that fact, this is still a crucial step.
From both a political and theoretical standpoint, the Czech government has recognized the threat from radical Islam exists. It remains to be seen if officials in Poland feel similarly. Warsaw must agree to the placement of the defense missiles in order for the shield to be established.

The Polish would be wise to look to their neighbors to the west, as the Czechs also realize the opportunity to become so closely tied to the United States is not one that can be missed. “We failed in the past by refusing the Marshall plan,” Topolánek said. “We cannot fail again.”